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SECTION 1983 AND THE LIABILITY
OF LOCAL OFFICIALS FOR
LAND USE DECISIONS
KENNETH PEARLMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A basic proposition of American democracy is that all individuals
are responsible for behaving in a manner that comports with the
United States Constitution and federal law. Of course, this notion
applies to governmental officials as well as to private individuals.
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with immunity.
All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest,
are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.1
The practical meaning of this proposition under any given set of cir-
cumstances depends upon a rapidly changing set of legal rules which
originated for the most part in close, controversial Supreme Court
decisions.2
* Associate Professor of City and Regional Planning, The Ohio State University.
A.B., M.C.P., University of Pennsylvania, 1964, 1974; J.D., Columbia University,
1967. The author is the editor of the Journal of the American Planning Association.
Katherine Gharrity and Jon Hallas, graduate students at Ohio State, assisted in the
research on this paper.
I. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
2. Of the recent Supreme Court decisions in this area, three have involved five-
four decisions. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (partial dissent).
These legal rules explain who qualifies for immunity for actions performed as part
of their jobs. Such rules are subject to numerous revisions. See Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This article explores the current status
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During the 1970's, a series of cases in the United States Supreme
Court dealt with various aspects of municipal service and the immu-
nity from suit for federal constitutional violations.3 Recently, the
pace of decisionmaking has accelerated, resulting in additions to and
modification of rules concerning the liability for official acts of both
municipal officials and the municipalities themselves.4 This article
discusses the liability of local officials, with particular attention to the
area of land use law.
In the area of land use, the legal issues raised in connection with
the immunity of officials are often more complex than those raised
generally in connection with municipal liability.5 The majority of
cases dealing with official liability and immunity have not been land
use cases. The cases, brought under Section 1983,6 typically involve
questions of judicial and legislative immunities accorded to judges,
prosecutors, legislators, and other officials.7 Thus, the development
of the rules and discusses how they affect local officials who participate in the devel-
opment of land use laws.
3. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
4. See pp. 66-76, infra, for a discussion of the recent cases. See also note 7 infra.
5. This complexity results from confusion regarding the role of local officials. Im-
"munity is granted only to judges, prosecutors, legislators, and a select group of gov-
emnment officials. See notes 52-84 and accompanying text infra. Whether land use
officials fall within the select group is unclear. In Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980), the Court explained the procedure for determining when a defendant
qualifies for immunity under § 1983. "Where the immunity claimed by the defendant
was well established at common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where its
rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have con-
strued the statute to incorporate that immunity." 445 U.S. at 638. When common
law did not grant immunity, the courts have relied upon public policy to determine
the issue. Id. See notes 38-50 and accompanying text infra. This article maintains
that local legislative officials should be granted absolute immunity when dealing with
land use issues.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). The provision is set forth in the text at p. 60
infra.
7. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States,
446 U.S. 719 (1980) (held that the Virginia Supreme Court acted in a legislative ca-
pacity when promulgating the state Code of Professional Responsibility, and hence
was immune from liability under § 1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (the
general rule calls for qualified immunity from liability for executive officials, al-
though certain crucial executives warrant absolute immunity); Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials are immune from liability under § 1983 unless
they know that their actions violate constitutional norms); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (held local
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of Section 1983 law has proceeded in the past with scant reference to
school board officials immune from liability because they acted in belief that their
actions were lawful); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (legislators have absolute
immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (held that judges are immune from
liability under § 1983; police officers are not immune from liability for an accusation
of false arrest, but can present the affirmative defenses of good faith and probable
cause); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators); Green v. De-
Camp, 612 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1980) (held that the Nebraska legislature was immune
from suit under § 1983 when preparing and publishing legislative committee reports);
Doe v. County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (social workers do not
have absolute immunity in suits for damages); Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care
Center, Inc. v. Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (municipal officials have a
qualified immunity when performing legislative activities).
Two important cases in this area, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978) and Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), focused on
the liability of municipalities and municipal officials. In Monell, the Supreme Court
held that municipalities were persons for purposes of § 1983 and thus could be sued
under that section for "monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief where. . .the ac-
tion that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
officers." 436 U.S. at 690. The Court also held that local governments can be sued for
deprivation of constitutional rights which result from actions authorized by govern-
ment custom. Id. at 690-91. Maneil overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
which held that Congress did not intend to "bring municipal corporations within the
ambit of [§ 1983]." 365 U.S. at 187. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, dissented in Monell because he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
legislative history of § 1983.
Monell was followed by Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Owen
stated the view that § 1983 imposes liability on every "person" and, under Monell,
this includes municipalities. The Court noted that municipalities traditionally have
not been immune from damage actions. Id. at 639-40. The Court recognized that the
doctrine distinguishing between government and proprietary functions provided for
immunity in certain situations for governmental action and, further, that legislative,
as opposed to ministerial actions, were immune from attack. Id. at 644. Nevertheless,
the Court held that these doctrines did not protect a municipality from suits under
§ 1983. Id. The Court found that the first doctrine did not apply because by enacting
§ 1983 Congress had, in effect, consented to suits against local governments. The
Court explained that the governmental-proprietary distinction was thus used to deter-
mine whether the government could be sued in unconsented situations. The legisla-
tive activity doctrine was designed to prevent the courts from interfering with
municipal discretion. The Court noted, however, that "(A) municipality has no 'dis-
cretion' to violate the Federal Constitution". Id. at 649. The Court observed that it
would be "'uniquely amiss'" if local governments "were permitted to disavow liabil-
ity for the injury it has begotten." Id. at 651.
Justice Powell, joined by three other justices, dissented. He argued that the history
of § 1983, good policy and current practice required that municipal governments be
able to raise a claim of qualified immunity based on action undertaken in good faith.
1d. at 658.
In Owen, the Court emphasized that granting municipal officials qualified or abso-
lute immunity meant that many plaintiffs would be denied relief if municipalities
1982]
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land use questions. In the last several years, however, a number of
land use cases have reached appellate courts, raising very complex
questions'. Understanding the difficult land use issues, however, first
requires a general understanding of Section 1983 and official
immunity.
II. SECTION 1983 AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
A. The Nature of Official Immunity
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 'deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 9
The language of Section 1983 clearly states three requirements for a
could not be sued. It can be argued that one effect of Monell and Owen is a new
awareness among potential plaintiffs of the possibility of lawsuits. Indeed, municipal-
ities and municipal officers are being sued at an increasing rate. During the 1970's,
the number of cases involving claims of official immunity under § 1983 increased
dramatically. This is not to say that lawsuits against municipal officials are a satisfac-
tory substitute for suits against a municipality. Rather, it only indicates that plaintiffs
have identified another type of defendant. That is, of course, not a complete substi-
tute for suits against a municipality. This is especially true, as will be seen, in light of
the uncertainty surrounding the rules involving suits against government officials.
8. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391 (1979) (held that members of the regional planning agency's governing board had
absolute immunity from liability in § 1983 suits for their legislative acts); Hernandez
v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982)
(mayor's veto of a zoning ordinance is a legislative function and hence immune from
liability under § 1983); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.
1980) (held city directors-absolutely immune with respect to the enactment of zoning
amendments); Centennial Land and Dev. Co. v. Township of Medford, 165 N.J.
Super. 220, 397 A.2d 1136 (1979) (held township zoning board has absolute immunity
as township actions were quasi-judicial); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264
Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (found that the action of county commissioners in approv-
ing zoning charges to be an exercise of judicial authority).
One spur to the increasing volume of litigation is the availability of attorneys' fees
to the victorious plaintiff. See Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (Supp. IV 1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). As the Court notes in
Thiboutot, § 1988 applies to every action to enforce § 1983 (and §§ 1981, 1982, 1985
and 1986), even if brought in state courts.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). Congress originally enacted § 1983 as part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 "to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
[Vol. 23:57
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cause of action. First, Section 1983 requires a defendant who has
acted under color of state or local law.' ° In this situation, color of
law is essentially equivalent to the state action requirement of the
fourteenth amendment."
Second, the 1983 action requires that the plaintiff show deprivation
of specific rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United
States Constitution or federal law.' 2 This means that damages are
available for losses suffered as a result of violations of either federal
constitutional or statutory law. No remedy is available under Section
1983, however, for violation of non-federal rights. Deprivation of
rights resulting from violation of state or local law is insufficient to
constitute a violation of Section 1983.1"
Third, defendant's conduct must in fact be a cause of plaintiff's
deprivation.' 4 The cause in fact element becomes crucial when a lo-
cal governmental body or a superior is sued for unconstitutional ac-
tions of employees or subordinates.' 5 The plaintiff bears the burden
ment to the Constitution of the United States." Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13.
10. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(196 1); German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 822, 828 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Rankin v. How-
ard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Ariz. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981).
11. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 38 (1979),
citing Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Professor Nahmod notes that
there are three classes of cases: those where a state employee acts on behalf of the
state pursuant to state authority; those where the employee acts in a manner inconsis-
tent with official policy; and those where a private person acts with some governmen-
tal involvement. Id. at 39.
Note that although § 1983 requires "color of law," other sections of the Civil Rights
acts do not necessarily require state action. See, concerning §§ 1985 and 1986,
Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Ariz. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939
(1981), and cases cited therein. See also German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
12. See note 10 supra. See also Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961);
Landrum v. Moates, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978). For
cases based upon violation of federal statutory law, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1 (1980) and Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). In Thiboutot, the Court
made clear that it felt that previous decisions had applied § 1983 to federal statutory
law. 448 U.S. at 4.
13. See German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 822, 829 (E.D. Mich. 1980), citing Mis-
souri ex rel. Gore v. Wochner, 620 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875
(1981).
14 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Cf. Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
15. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See also S.
NAHMOD, supra note 11, at 87.
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of proving that defendant's actions were a cause of the deprivation;' 6
the burden then shifts to the defendant to show some other, constitu-
tionally permissible, reason for defendant's actions.'
7
When these three requirements are met, the plaintiff has estab-
lished a cause of action. Usually, the plaintiff seeks to recover dam-
ages. Defendants, however, can sometimes avoid liability by
claiming immunity.'8 Uncertainty exists regarding the availability
and extent of immunity for certain individuals under Section 1983.
On its face, Section 1983 contains no mention of any immunities.
The statute imposes liability upon "every person"'19 who deprives an-
other of constitutional rights under certain circumstances.2" No lan-
guage in the statute specifies any exemptions. Section 1983's
language serves a broad purpose of assuring that a "damage remedy
against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for
vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees."'" Courts have em-
phasized that this purpose must be broadly interpreted and "con-
strued generously."'22
There are, however, countervailing policy considerations. Some
concern exists regarding the effect of lawsuits on the performance of
governmental officials and their willingness to undertake responsibil-
ities. This concern antedates the passage of Section 1983; it devel-
oped initially under the common law. "[T]he common law soon
recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform their offi-
cial functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability."23 A
16. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). See S. NAHMOD, supra note 11, at 97-
98.
17. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). See also S. NAHMOD, supra note
11, at § 8.13 (Supp. 1980).
18. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (public official with qualified
immunity may claim that he acted in good faith as an affirmative defense); Hutchin-
son v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (legislative immunity for all speeches made in
the Senate); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qualified immunity for
prison officials); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (legislative immunity); Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (qualified legislative immunity protects Sena-
tors' aides); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity).
19. Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1980), rep'd on other
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
20. Id.
21. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
22. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980). See also Marrapese v. Rhode
Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980).
23. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239 n.4, pro-
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recent case, German v. Killeen,24 drew upon several Supreme Court
decisions to set forth three policy reasons for immunity. These poli-
cies underlie both the grant of immunity to officials under common
law and the extension of immunity to other public officials. First,
immunity prevents injustice to an official whose position requires him
to exercise discretion.2" Second, immunity fosters a willingness to ex-
ecute responsibilities that an employee might be reluctant to under-
take if subjected to personal liability.26 Finally, immunity eliminates
the fear that "threat of personal liability might deter citizens from
holding public office." 27
These policies formed the traditional basis for granting immunity
at common law. One might argue that Congress' failure to mention
immunities when it enacted Section 1983 indicates an intention to
abolish the common law immunities for purposes of the provision.
The Supreme Court considered that argument in Tenney v.
Brandhove28 but rejected it. Speaking for the Court, Justice Frank-
furter stated "(w)e cannot believe that Congress. . .would impinge
on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclu-
sion in the general language before us."29
Thus, a conflict exists between the policy of broad liability, re-
flected in the language of Section 1983, and the need for immunities,
shown by the policy justifications set out in German v. Killeen. Reso-
vides a history of the development of immunity in the common law. See also Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. Rnv. 209
(1963). For other sources on the historical development of the immunity doctrine at
common law and under § 1983, see Carlisle, Evolution of§ 1983-Verdict in on Liabil-
ity but Jury Out on Remedy, 12 URB. LAw. 727 (1980); Casto, Innovations in the De-
fense of Official Immunity under § 1983, 47 TENN. L. REV. 47 (1979); Note, The
Municipal Zoning Power and § 1983 Liability After Owen v. City of Independence, 12
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 209 (1981). For a thorough discussion of the need for the protection
of individual civil rights versus the need for governmental entities and officials to be
free to carry out their duties, see Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local
Governmental Entities and Officials: Rights of Action, Immunities, and Federalism, 53
S. CAL. L. REv. 945 (1980).
24. 495 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
25. Id. at 830.
26. Id. at 830, citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
27. Id. at 830, citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See also Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); Centennial
Land & Dev. Co. v. Township of Medford, 165 N.J. Super. 220,397 A.2d 1136 (1979).
28. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
29. Id. at 376.
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lution of these conflicting policies begins with statutory interpreta-
tion. Given that Section 1983 contains no express grant of
.immunities, courts look to whether Congress intended to abolish the
immunity of particular governmental officials as it existed at common
law.30
The Supreme Court dealt with this question of congressional intent
in Tenney v. Brandhove,31 where it considered whether a state legisla-
tive committee had immunity against a claim that it impermissibly
called the plaintiff as a witness in order to intimidate the plaintiffs
exercise of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. 32 The Ten-
ney Court looked to common law practice and the long history, in
both England and in the United States, of "[tlhe privilege of legisla-
tors to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in
legislative proceedings. 33 The Court held that enactment of Section
1983 and other provisions in the Civil Rights Act did not abrogate
the common law immunity of legislators.34 Several subsequent deci-
sions35 followed the Tenney approach and continued to rely on the
common law practice in determining whether or not certain officials
were entitled to immunity.36 The opinions display extensive inquiry
into exactly what constituted the common law practice and how Con-
gress intended to affect it by enacting Section 1983.37
The Court's inquiry goes beyond an examination of common law
practice and speculation about congressional intent, however. In its
effort to resolve the conflict between a plaintiffs right to redress for
wrongful action taken against him and the need for immunities, the
Supreme Court also examines public policy considerations involved
in a controversy.38 Consideration of public policy, in addition to reli-
30. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,502 n.30 (1978); Procunier v. Nava-
rette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
31. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
32. Id. at 371.
33. Id. at 372.
34. Id. at 379.
35. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
36. See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
37. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
38. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). A federal district court in
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ance on common law practice, is necessary because courts must oc-
cassionally infer the existence of immunities in situations not found
in common law. Cases today arise involving officials whose existence
was unknown to the common law or to the framers of Section 1983.)
In addition, many activities engaged in by today's officials were also
unknown to the common law, particularly in the land use area. This
fact is important since an official's activities determines, to some ex-
tent, whether and to what extent the official is entitled to immunity.
When faced with a case of this kind, most courts recognize the need
for inquiry into public policy. Nevertheless, the extent to which pub-
lic policy considerations can be examined independently of common
law practice remains uncertain.'4
In its most recent opinions,4' the United States Supreme Court has
employed an inquiry which scrutinizes both common law and public
policy.42 Gomez v. Toledo43 involved an action brought under Sec-
tion 1983 against a public official.' The Court discussed several
cases in which it had held certain governmental officials entitled to
qualified immunity.45 Recognition of the right of some public offi-
German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Mich. 1980), reviewed the Supreme Court
decision in this area and distilled three public policy reasons for immunity. See notes
24-27 and accompanying text supra.
39. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391 (1979). This case involved members of the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, a multi-state organization. Plaintiffs challenged whether the agency mem-
bers enjoyed absolute immunity from suit. The plaintiffs argued that absolute immu-
nity should not be granted because such immunity for legislative officials derives from
the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 6) which, they asserted, does not apply at the regional level. The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and noting that
regional legislators need the immunity protection as much as legislators at the state
and federal levels. The Court also relied on public policy considerations and the
similarity between state and regional legislators to reach its conclusion. See notes
121-32 and accompanying text infra.
40. See Doe v. County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) where the
court recognized immunities in a variety of areas "although such immunities are with-
out support in either the language or history of the statute." Id. at 180.
41. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
42. See text accompanying notes 43-50 infra.
43. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
44. Id. at 635.
45. Id. at 639 citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (immunity granted to a
police officer). See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (immunity for
prison officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (immunity for local school
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cials to such immunity was based on an unwillingness to infer from
legislative silence a congressional intention to abrogate immunities
that were both "well established at common law" and "compatible
with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act."46  In Imbler v.
Pachtman,47 the Court held findings of immunity were "predicated
upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded
the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it."4 8
Wood v. Strickland49 stated the Supreme Court's combined inquiry
most concisely, holding that the right to qualified immunity was es-
tablished on the basis of "[clommon law tradition . . . and strong
public policy reasons."50
The cases discussed in Gomez51 dealt with the availability of a cer-
tain type of immunity-qualified immunity-for local government
officials, as did the Gomez case itself. There exist, however, two types
of immunity, which should be examined in some detail.
B. Absolute and Qualofed Immunity
Under Section 1983 case law, courts have granted two types of im-
munity-absolute or qualified. Once a court resolves the question
whether an official is entitled to any immunity under the particular
circumstances, the question arises whether the official's immunity
should be absolute or qualified. Absolute immunity means immunity
from all types of liability. For example, in Supreme Court of Virginia
v. Consumers' Union,52 the United States Supreme Court held that
the nature of absolute immunity under Section 1983 was so compre-
hensive as to prohibit awards of attorneys' fees, even if plaintiff
proved that the defendant had violated his constitutional rights. 3
Absolute immunity defeats a suit for damages at the pleadings
board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (immunity for the state
governor and other executive officers). For a discussion of qualified immunity, see
notes 56-57, 92-115 and accompanying text infra.
46. Id. at 638, quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
47. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
48. Id. at 421.
49. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
50. Id. at 318.
51. See note 45 supra.
52. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
53. Id. at 738.
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stage. 5 4 So long as the defendant can show that his actions were
within the scope of the immunity, the defendant avoids litigating the
merits altogether."
Courts often find an official entitled to some immunity but feel
that, due to certain facts, immunity should be qualified.56 For an
official entitled to qualified immunity, liability depends on the cir-
cumstances surrounding the official's actions, including his motiva-
tion for the action being challenged.57 Determination of liability,
therefore, requires a trial to establish the relevant evidence.
Given the availability of both absolute and qualified immunity, it
becomes the task of the courts to determine which type of immunity
applies to any particular official. Initially, that determination de-
pends largely on the court's interpretation of congressional intent re-
garding preservation of common law immunities, coupled with
consideration of public policy.
1. Absolute Immunity
Courts have generally concluded that there are three types of indi-
54. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky,
626 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1980); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474
F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1979); Robinson v. City of Raytown, 606 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980).
55. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogos-
lavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
56. The Supreme Court has maintained that the immunity should be qualified in
order to protect private citizens from the misconduct of government officials. Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
57. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) the Court stated that
[A] qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of the gov-
ermnent, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and respon-
sibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at
the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence
of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers conduct.
Id. at 247-48.
Therefore, the officer must have a reasonable belief held in good faith to receive
qualified immunity. This standard was explained further in Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975), when the Court held that an official is not immune if the official
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [person] affected,
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury .. " Id. at 322.
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
viduals entitled to absolute immunity for their official activities:
judges, legislators, and prosecutors. In Bradley v. Fisher,5  the
Supreme Court noted that immunity for judges "in the exercise of
their judicial functions" had been "the settled doctrine of the English
courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are
aware of, in the courts of this country." 9 The Court found a similar
immunity for legislators in Tenney v. Brandhove.60 The reasons for
granting such immunity, as discussed earlier, involve freeing the offi-
cials from fear of litigation and encouraging the officials to perform
their duties without undue inhibition of discretion. For the same rea-
sons, the Court in Imbler v. Pachtman held prosecutors entitled to
absolute immunity.61
A court's initial inquiry is thus whether an official is a judge, legis-
lator, or prosecutor. If the official is found to be in such a position,
the court must determine whether the official was acting in a judicial,
legislative, or prosecutorial capacity. In Tenney, the Court held that
state legislators are absolutely immune from damage actions when
they act "in a field where legislators traditionally have power to
act .... "62 Thus, while a legislator will be absolutely immune for
action taken in connection with enactment of legislation or other con-
stitutionally granted action, he will not be immune for activity be-
yond the scope of that which is constitutionally permitted. 63 For
example, if a legislator publicly distributes material infringing on the
rights of private individuals, as opposed to distribution of such mate-
rial within a committee, no immunity will attach.' 4
In short, whenever a court determines that a judge, legislator, or
58. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
59. Id. at 347.
60. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
61. 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978);
Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1981); Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564
(3d Cir. 1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976); Halpern v. City of
New Haven, 489 F. Supp. 841 (D. Conn. 1980); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 456
F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1978); C.M. Clark Ins. Agency v. Reed, 390 F. Supp. 1056
(S.D. Tex. 1975).
62. 341 U.S. at 379.
63. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972) (Speech and Debate
Clause does not exempt United States Senator or aide from an otherwise valid crimi-
nal law for action taken in preparation for or in the implementation of legislative
acts).
64. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972).
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prosecutor is acting within the scope of judicial, legislative, or
prosecutorial authority, the official will enjoy absolute immunity
from prosecution. The court grants this immunity regardless of the
motivation for the action. In other words, even if the official acts out
of malice or corruption, absolute immunity will still attach.65 Under
the common law, then, all that matters is whether the individual is a
certain type of official acting within the scope of his authority.
As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,66 a case arising out of civil claims for damages against
President Nixon. The Court held that the President enjoyed a unique
status among executive officials and was entitled to absolute immu-
nity.67 The Court was careful to emphasize this unique status.68
Thus, Nixon is not likely to effect Section 1983 law as applied to the
chief administrative officers at other levels of government. 69
Obviously, many officials are not judges, legislators, prosecutors or
the President of the United States. These officials sometimes enjoy
absolute immunity, rather than merely qualified immunity, by virtue
of some doctrine other than the existence of immunity at common
law.7" Some officials achieve immunity as employees of persons who
enjoy common law absolute immunity.7' In recent cases, the
Supreme Court has extended the protection of absolute immunity to
congressional aides, committee staff, and committee consultants in-
65. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554 (1967) (immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting mali-
ciously or corruptly); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872).
66. 50 U.S.L.W. 4797 (U.S. June 24, 1982) (No. 79-1738).
67. Id. at 4802.
68. Id. at 4802-03.
69. The Court did not extend this immunity to presidential assistants. See notes
95-98 and accompanying text infra.
70. See, e.g., Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391 (1979) (need to protect the public good); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978) (judicial character of administrative agency adjudications); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (eliminate the fear of prosecution). See notes 71-76
and accompanying text infra.
71. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (public officials); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (congressional staff); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1972) (congressional aides); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1981) (court
clerks for actions performed at the direction of the judge); Fowler v. Alexander, 340
F, Supp. 168 (D.C. N.C. 1972) a/I'd 478 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1973) (judicial officers).
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vestigating and introducing material at committee hearings.72 The
Court expressed concern in Gravel v. United States73 that the effec-
tiveness of a legislator could be impaired by fear that subordinates
would be sued.74 Under Gravel, if a legislator would himself be im-
mune from liability, then where the legislator's actions affect a
subordinate, immunity for the subordinate is absolute.7" In like
manner, a number of courts have accorded absolute immunity to ju-
dicial employees or other employees whose actions are an integral
part of the judicial process.76
Some officials cannot derive their immunity indirectly as employ-
ees of immune officials. To determine when these officials obtain ab-
solute immunity, courts follow what is known as the functional
analogy approach, developed by the Supreme Court in Butz v. Econo-
moU.77 The Court in Economou recognized the necessity of absolute
immunity "to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can per-
form their respective functions without harassment or intimida-
tion."7" From this premise, the Court went on to state a key notion:
We think that adjudication within a federal administrative
agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial pro-
cess that those who participate in such adjudication should also
be immune from suits for damages.79
The Court pointed out that similar procedures and safeguards are
72. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972).
73. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
74. Id. at 617.
75. The Court in Gravel emphasizes that where their action is illegal, legislative
employees will not be protected even if the action (and their roles leading up to the
action) is protected. For example, if the U.S. House of Representatives passes a legis-
lative resolution authorizing an illegal arrest, the staff members will be absolutely
immune for their work in passing the resolution but not in carrying out the illegal
arrest. See Kilburn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Moreover, if an employee
commits illegal acts during the course of otherwise-protected authority, he will not be
immune. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
76. Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1981); Kermit Constr. Corp.
v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); Burkes v. Callion, 433
F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971); German v. Killeen, 495 F.
Supp. 822 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
77. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
78. Id. at 512.
79. Id. at 512-13.
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present in federal hearings and court proceedings, concluding that
"there can be little doubt that the role of the modem federal hearing
examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is 'func-
tionally comparable' to that of a judge.""0
Further, the Court in Economou described certain positions with
functions analogous to those of a prosecutor; those positions are also
entitled to absolute immunity."' The Economou opinion placed
strong reliance on the need to protect the decision-making process
engaged in by these officials.8 2 The Court weighed the risk of an
unconstitutional act against the preservation of independent judg-
ment and came down in favor of the latter.83 The functional analogy
approach has been followed by the courts in a number of recent
cases.
84
At least one commentator has argued that the Economou decision
indicates the Supreme Court is moving in a new direction. Edith
Netter, in her article Official Liability Under Section 1983: The Immu-
nity Maze,8" states that prior to Economou, courts used an "extent of
discretion" test and accorded greater immunity to officials with
greater discretion. 6 The Economou decision, under her analysis,
marks a departure which will change the approach taken by courts.87
Netter notes, however, that the difference between the extent of dis-
cretion test and the functional analogy test is not perfectly clear. 8
To this writer, the differences between the two tests are minimal.
The language of some of the earlier cases suggests that "extent of
discretion" is simply a phrase which describes one of the underlying
policy considerations for granting immunity. When the Court in
Economou argued that one official performs functions analogous to
those performed by another official and, therefore, it is equally im-
80. Id.
81. Id. at 515.
82. Id. at 516.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
678 (1981); Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
85. 32 LAND USE L. & ZONINo DIG. 3, Feb. 1980.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id.
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portant to protect the former's independence,89 the Court might well
have been saying that the official deserved protection because he ex-
ercised more discretion.
Whether or not that is so, this writer considers the functional anal-
ogy test preferable for a number of reasons. The amount of discre-
tion held by one official in comparison to another official is a difficult
thing to measure. Does a school administrator have more or less dis-
cretion than a planner? In a more complicated vein, does a school
administrator performing a particular action have more or less dis-
cretion than a planner performing a different action? The functional
analogy approach, which begins with the common law immunities
and moves on to public policy considerations, allows for a degree of
clarity and a limited amount of analysis. As the Eighth Circuit has
noted:
A finding of qualified immunity is usually preseded by an in-
quiry into whether the public official in question enjoyed immu-
nity at common law. There is, of course, no pre-Section 1983
common law with regard to the liability of public defenders.
The dispositive question, then, is whether some degree of immu-
nity is justified as a matter of public policy.9 0
Courts determine whether or not immunity is justified by examining
how the functions of the official in question relate to those of other
officials who regularly exercise discretion. Courts do not, however,
weigh the amount of discretion; it is unlikely that they could.
Therefore, under the Economou functional analogy approach,
courts will grant absolute immunity to officials who function analo-
gously to those enjoying such immunity at common law. When an
officials functions are not sufficiently analogous but, due to public
policy considerations, the official deserves protection from damage
actions, courts will grant qualified immunity. It would appear that
courts will find that any official who exercises some discretion is enti-
tled to qualified immunity under certain circumstances.9
89. 438 U.S. at 514.
90. Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
91. Presumably, the extent of discretion test remains relevant for officials not ex-
ercising discretion, Ze., acting in a ministerial function. If the action is illegal, the
official will be liable. The purposes for § 1983 immunity are relevant, however, if the
official had some discretion in the matter. Thus, a policeman has some discretion as
to whether to apprehend and arrest a suspicious individual running out of a store
window with a radio partially hidden under his jacket, but the policeman has no
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2. Qualified Immunity
Having decided that an official enjoys qualified immunity, a court
must determine when that immunity is applicable. Until recently,
Courts had used a two-part test to aid in this determination. An offi-
cial would escape liability for a violation of Section 1983
so long as he meets both the subjective and objective tests of
pood faith, that is, he must have believed in his own mind that
s conduct was lawful and his belief must have been reasonable
in the light of settled principles of constitutional law.92
The two parts of this test raise different issues.
In the past, the subjective part of the test posed no great problem.
Essentially, there had to be an absence of malice, and the inquiry
would be into the defendant's state of mind.93 The question was
whether defendant had a good faith belief in the lawfulness of his
conduct or whether he had an intent to injure. This test had not been
difficult to apply.94
As this article went to press, the Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald,95 a case involving civil claims for damages against President
Nixon and some of his aides, held that the subjective test created an
excessive burden on officials by making it too easy to sue based on a
defendant's state of mind.96 Thus, the Court eliminated the subjec-
tive test for suits against federal officials.97 In a footnote, the Court
indicated that this conclusion would also hold for Section 1983
discretion to refuse to make an arrest ordered by a judge. In the first case, the police-
man should enjoy qualified immunity. In the second? "So if the speaker by authority
of the House shall order an illegal act, though that authority shall exempt him from
questions, his order shall no more justify the person who executed it than King
Charles' warrant for levying ship money could justify his revenue officers," Stockard
v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (1839).
What then of the building inspector who refuses to issue a building permit because
it has not been authorized by an appropriate body? In tort law, he would act at his
own peril. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser criticizes
the use of discretion as a test because of the impossibility of drawing the line between
discretionary and non-discretionary functions. Id.
92. Doe v. County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 179, 181 (E.D. N.Y. 1980).
93. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974).
94. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
95. 50 U.S.L.W. 4815 (U.S. June 24, 1982) (No. 80-945).
96. Id. at 4820.
97. Id.
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cases.
98
Consequently, after Harlow only the objective test remains and it
has proven troublesome. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,99 the Supreme Court
stated that the availability of qualified immunity to government offi-
cials would depend upon scope of the officials' discretion, responsibil-
ities of office, and all circumstances as they "reasonably appeared" at
the time of the action being challenged. 1"° Setting forth a broad stan-
dard, the Court held that "[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds
for the belief formed at the time and in the light of all the circum-
stances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for quali-
fied immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct."' '1
In Wood v. Strickland,1"2 the Supreme Court adopted a "reasona-
bleness" guide for deciding what constitutes good faith.103 Rejecting
an objective/subjective choice, the Court stated that not only must a
school board member have the requisite good intent, but he must
meet a standard based on "knowledge of the basic, unquestioned
constitutional rights of his charges."'" The school official must
know or reasonably should have known that his actions would not
violate a student's constitutional rights.1 5 The Court does not, by
this standard, expect the official to be able to predict the future course
of constitutional law.
Justice Powell, believing that the majority in Wood was requiring a
higher standard than in previous cases, filed a separate opinion. Jus-
tice Powell contended that what constitutes "settled constitutional
law" is often open to dispute.1 0 6 He argued that even settled consti-
98. Id. at 4820 n.30. The Court also refused to extend a blanket immunity to
Presidential aides, even though in a companion case it held the President to be abso-
lutely immune from civil suits. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra. The Court
distinguished the Gravel derivative immunity doctrine (see text accompanying notes
73-76 supra) by limiting that form of immunity to aides of judges, legislatures, and
prosecutors performing only judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions. Id. at
4818.
99. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
100. Id. at 247.
101. Id. at 247-48.
102. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
103. Id. at 322.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 329.
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tutional principles may be quickly overturned, especially when five-
four decisions are common. 10
7
Nonetheless, Wood v. Strickland expanded the good faith doctrine
with its controversial holding that school officials were responsible
for knowledge of basic constitutional principles. The Court's deci-
sion involved only the field of education, so it remains unclear
whether this standard should be applied to other administrative
offices.
O'Connor v. Donaldson' o8 followed shortly after Wood. O'Connor
involved a former mental patient who sued a hospital superintendent
for keeping him confined even though he was not mentally ill. The
superintendent claimed a defense of good faith action taken under a
state law which he believed was valid."°9 The superintendent argued
that he could not reasonably have known that the law was, in fact,
invalid."o0 The Court reiterated that, under Wood, the relevant ques-
tion was whether a defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that his conduct would violate someone's constitutional
rights."' The Court added that "[flor purposes of this question, an
official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseen constitutional
developments.""' 2 By this language, the majority diminished the
concern, expressed by some members of the Court in Wood, over
requiring a defendant to know whether the law under which he acts is
constitutional. The Court did not, however, totally allay the concern.
Under O'Connor, a defendant had no duty to anticipate unforesee-
able constitutional developments." 3
In Harlow Y. Fitzgerald,"4 the Court clarified this to some extent
by noting that where the law was not clearly established, an official
could not be responsible for anticipating subsequent legal develop-
ments." 5 Thus, the problem of anticipating developments is elimi-
nated although the question of whether the law is clearly established
is anything but cut and dried. In considering the issue of objective
107. Id.
108. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
109. Id. at 569.
110. Id. at 576.
111. Id. at 577.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 50 U.S.L.W. 4815 (U.S. June 24, 1982) (No. 80-945).
115. Id. at 4820.
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good faith in the land use context, the reader should keep in mind the
following questions: Should the status of the official make a differ-
ence? How much time was available for deliberating over the deci-
sion? Was a lawyer available to explain the relevant law? How
settled is the law in the area? In the absence of more than a few court
decisions, is a defendant free to presume that he is not responsible for
knowledge of the law since there may well be no clearly established
law? If a decision-making body strictly follows some standard proce-
dures, are courts less likely to find that body or its members
"unreasonable"?
The courts have not yet provided answers to these questions.
Many of these issues will undoubtedly work their way up to the
Supreme Court." 6 Such issues are particularly crucial in the field of
land use because many principles of constitutional law relating to
zoning and other land use areas remain undecided or unclear despite
seventy years of litigation.
III. SECTION 1983 AND LAND USE
While the Supreme Court has decided a number of Section 1983
cases involving municipalities and local officials, few cases directly
involved land use issues. As a consequence, uncertainties remain in
Section 1983 law concerning the extent of its applicability to land use
decisions. Courts must address two important questions in this area.
First, do local officials enjoy either qualified or absolute immunity?
Second, how should a court characterize the actions of such officials?
A. Governmental Immunity and Local Legislative Officials.
When considering the extent of Section 1983's applicability to the
local level, a major issue is the degree of immunity to be accorded
local legislative officials. While there has been no difficulty finding
that local administrative officials are only entitled to qualified immu-
nity, 1 7 controversy exists over whether to extend absolute immunity
to local legislative officials. The Supreme Court has not yet ad-
116. For a review of decided cases, see S. NAHMOD, supra note 11, appendix A;
Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local Governments, Entities and Officials:
Rights o/Action, Immunities and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 945, 1021-1059
(1980).
117. See Thomas v. Younglove, 545 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Diamond,
519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Curry v. Gillette, 461 F.2d 1003 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Parine v. Levine, 274 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
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dressed this question. Lower court opinions, however, provide some
guidance. Most early cases held that local officials do not enjoy abso-
lute immunity for legislative decisions.18 Courts taking this position
reason that local legislative officials were not immune at common
law." 9 Recently, however, some courts have reached a contrary
conclusion.' 2
0
While the Supreme Court has yet to speak to the issue, a recent
decision provides a clue to the Court's view on the question. One
issue with which the Court dealt with in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 12 1 was whether the individual mem-
bers of the governing body of an interstate regional planning agency
were entitled to absolute immunity.1 22 Some doubt existed about
whether the governing officials were, in fact, legislators. 23  The
Court chose to treat the officials, who had adopted a land use plan, as
legislators undertaking actions which were legislative in character. 12
4
The principal issue in Lake Country Estates was whether Section
1983 absolute immunity applied to regional legislators or was limited
to legislators at federal and state levels. The Court held that absolute
immunity extended to regional legislators. 25 The Court based its
holding, not on any common law argument, but on the need for im-
munity to protect the public good. 126 The same rationale that ap-
118. See Lane v. Inman, 509 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975); Curry v. Gillette, 461 F.2d
1003 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th
Cir. 1958); Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
119. See Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701,707 (1st Cir. 1953) (Magruder, J.,
concurring). See also Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1958).
120. See Shannon Fredericksburg Motor Inn v. Hicks, 434 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va.
1977); Teamsters Local 822 v. City of Portsmouth, 423 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Va. 1975),
aff'd, 534 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976).
121. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
122. Id. at 393.
123. 440 U.S. at 407-09.
124. Id. at 405. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in part, found the classification in-
appropriate for several reasons. He expressed uncertainty as to the meaning of the
term "regional legislator" used by the Court to describe the officials. Id. at 408. Jus-
tice Blackmun pointed out that the officials possessed some executive powers and that
they were not accountable to the electorate. Id. He also noted that the agency lacked
rules for internal discipline, unlike most legislative bodies. .d. Despite his dissent,
one cannot infer that Justice Blackmun would not extend § 1983 immunity to the
local level. Central to his dissent was the Court's characterization of the agency offi-
cials as legislators.
125. Id. at 406.
126. Id. at 405, citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
plied to legislative officials at the state and federal level, the Court
reasoned, should apply here. The Court cited its prior decision in
Butz v. Economou as support for its conclusion.' 27 In Economou, the
Court emphasized that it was the "nature of the responsibilities" and
not the particular location within the government which determined
whether there was absolute immunity. 2 ' Since Economou involved
federal officials, it was not directly applicable. The Court's discus-
sion of that case, however, reemphasized its reliance on the func-
tional approach.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Lake Country Estates extended abso-
lute immunity to regional level officials. The Court, however, specifi-
cally refrained from deciding whether its holding should also apply
to local governmental officials at county and municipal levels. 129
Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's decision to limit its
holding to the regional level. He believed the logic of the holding
required its application to local officials as well, and he explicitly
challenged the desireability of extending absolute immunity to such
officials. Justice Marshall argued that "if the sole inquiry under that
test is the nature of the officials' responsibilities,. . . not the common
law and constitutional underpinnings of the privilege itself... 10
127. 440 U.S. at 405 n.30.
128. Id.
129. Id at 404 n.26. The Court stated: "Whether individuals performing legisla-
tive functions at the purely local level, as opposed to the regional level, should be
afforded absolute immunity from federal damage claims is a question not presented
in this case." Id.
In support of their claim that absolute immunity did not extend to the TRPA offi-
cials, petitioners argued that the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, art. I,
§ 6, did not apply to state or "regional legislators." Id. at 404. The Court rejected the
argument citing the public need for absolute immunity. The majority also asserted
that immunity under § 1983 arose from an interpretation of federal law, not from a
constitutional provision which may or may not be applicable. Id. The Speech and
Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." Id. at 404 n.27,
citing, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6. The Court reasoned that the clause was not applicable
to state legislators and therefore did not apply to "regional legislators." 440 U.S. at
404.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that some lower federal courts had found the
Speech and Debate Clause applicable to state legislatures. Apparently because of
these decisions and the fact that the issue of application of the Clause to State legisla-
tures was not directly presented, Justice Blackmun dissented from the majority's per-
emptory consideration of the question. Id. at 409.
130. 440 U.S. at 408.
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then Section 1983 protection could presumably extend to local offi-
cials, in derogation of the need to find exceptions on a narrow ba-
sis. "' Justice Marshall also expressed concern that the regional
legislators were beyond electorate control and that the grant of abso-
lute immunity under these circumstances increased to a dangerous
degree the lack of accountability felt by some appointed officials.'
31
While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the extension of
absolute legislative immunity to the local level, some lower courts
have dealt with the issue. The Eighth Circuit in Gorman Towers, Inc.
v. Bogoslavsky133 addressed the question whether absolute immunity
extended to local officials acting in a legislative capacity.134 In
Gorman, the city directors (i.e., "legislators"), rezoned some property
to a single-family classification. This prevented the plaintiff from
building a proposed multi-family project which would have been per-
missible under the previous ordinance. The court first observed that
state and regional legislators have an absolute federal common law
immunity from "liability for damages occasioned by their legislative
acts . ..,)135 an immunity left untouched by enactment of Section
1983. In support of this proposition, the court cited Lake Country
Estates.136
Common law immunity did not, however, provide the basis for the
court's decision. In reaching its conclusion, the Gorman court consid-
ered the conflicting policy arguments for immunity.' 37 The court
found a strong interest in having governmental officials free from fear
of litigation. At the same time, the court reasoned that society has an
interest in checking improper conduct. The court contended that the
interest in freeing officials from fear of litigation was just as impor-
tant at the local level as it was for the state legislators in Tenney v.
Brandhove. 38 Further, the court argued that such interests may be
even more important at the local level. "I The court referred to Ligon
131. Id.
132. Id. at 407.
133. 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
134. Id. at 612.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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v. Maryland,4° a federal district court case that suggested that the
proximity of local officials to their constituents makes them even
more vulnerable to suit than state or federal officials. 141 The Ligon
court believed this was especially true in the land use area, where
local decision-making can have a direct and substantial effect on the
value and development of property.
1 42
The Gorman court rejected the notion that absolute legislative im-
munity depends on a particular system of institutional checks and
balances. The court argued that it is not the particular form or proce-
dure which is important; what is important is whether there are effec-
tive checks, in whatever form, on improper legislative conduct.1 43
The opinion listed four factors in a local land use case which provide
such checks. First, a plaintiff can attack a zoning decision on direct
judicial review as being arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Sec-
ond, a plaintiff can go into federal court to attack unfair legislation.
Third, a federal statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 242, a criminal
analogue of Section 1983, punishes willful deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. Finally, local legislators are subject to the electoral pro-
cess' 44 Since all four factors are present in a land use case whether
or not immunity is granted, the court's argument loses some of it per-
suasiveness. The basic point, however, is that these checks are simi-
lar to the typical restraints on legislative behavior, and, because of
this similarity, provide an argument that local legislators are no dif-
ferent from legislators at other levels for purposes of Section 1983.
A number of other recent decisions have adopted the position
taken in Gorman, most notably the Fourth Circuit in Bruce v. Rid-
dle.145 The court in Uddle reiterated the important points set forth
by the Gorman court regarding public policy and checks on improper
140. 448 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1977).
141. Id. at 947.
142. Id.
143. 626 F.2d at 613.
144. Id.
145. 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of
Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (E.D. Va. 1979); Kent Island Joint Venture v.
Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455,458-59 (D. Md. 1978); Ligon v. Maryland, 448 F. Supp. 935,
947 (D. Md. 1977); Blake v. Town of Delaware City, 441 F. Supp. 1189, 1200-01 (D.
Del. 1977); Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237, 241-44 (D. Del.
1968). But see Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1958); Fox Valley Repro-
ductive Health Care Center v. Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (local
legislators allowed only qualified immunity).
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legislative conduct.' 4 6 In addition, the Fourth Circuit referred back
to Owen v. City of Independence, where the Supreme Court held that
a city did not enjoy any Section 1983 immunities. 47 The Riddle
court noted that in the dissent in Owen, four Justices stated that a city
councilman was absolutely immune under the Lake Country Estates
doctrine.'48 Even though that was not the position of the Supreme
Court's majority in Owen, the Riddle court considered the statement
significant. Since the point was not a source of dispute between the
Owen majority and minority, the inference is that the Supreme Court
will probably allow immunity for local level officials.
Other circuit courts have ruled favorably on a grant of absolute
immunity to local officials. Most recently, the Fifth Circuit ruled in
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette149 that local legislative actions are en-
titled to absolute immunity.15 The Hernandez court reasoned the
logical implication of holding legislators at state levels absolutely im-
mune is that local legislative actions should also be held absolutely
immune. 15'
There are, to be sure, federal appellate court cases taking a more
equivocal position. In Morrison v. Jones,'52 the Ninth Circuit refused
to extend absolute immunity to members of a county board of super-
visors, arguing that the Supreme Court had not yet done so.'53 The
Ninth Circuit also found, however, that the record was not suffi-
ciently developed to conclude that the dispute involved legislative ac-
tivity.' 54 A Fifth Circuit case, Crowe v. Lucas, 5 relied on Monell v.
Department of Social Services to rule that it made no sense to allow a
major or local alderman a greater amount of immunity than that al-
lowed the city itself.'56 At the same time, though, the court made no
judgment regarding whether a legislative activity was present. Since
neither court expressly found legislative activity before refusing to
146. 631 F.2d at 274-75.
147. Id. at 275. See note 7 supra
148. Id. at 279, citing 445 U.S. 622, 664 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
149. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
150. Id. at 1193.
151. Id. at 1194.
152. 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
153. Id. at 1274.
154. Id.
155. 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
156. Id. at 989. See note 7 supra.
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grant absolute immunity, the decisions constitute only dicta. To date,
no circuit court has explicitly held that absolute immunity does not
extend to local legislative officials.' 57
In sum, the decisions favoring an extension of absolute immunity
to local legislative officials were decided directly on point and with-
out dicta, they reflect the reasoning of at least some members of the
Supreme Court, and they are consistent with the Supreme Court's
increased reliance on the functional approach. The opposing deci-
sions are less firm and fail to provide strong support for the refusal to
extend immunity. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on
this issue, all indications strongly suggest that the Court will accord
absolute immunity to local legislative officials.
B. The Character of the Action
Once courts determine the status of local governmental officials
with respect to Section 1983, they must resolve the issue of how to
characterize an action of a local or regional land use official. As dis-
cussed above, courts only grant absolute immunity to an official who
is performing a legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial act.158 Thus, un-
der Butz v. Economou, the issue is whether any particular action is
sufficiently similar to a legislative or judicial action, rather than an
administrative action, to warrant protection under the absolute im-
munity doctrine. 159 If not, then the official will only receive qualified
immunity. 160 Thus, the classification of official action is crucial to
Section 1983 analysis.
In the field of land use control, however, this approach poses se-
vere problems. First, courts have not clearly defined the distinction
between legislative, judicial, or executive acts for purpose of Section
1983. Second, courts have been slow to clarify the legal theories un-
derlying many basic zoning concepts. For example, one only has to
consider the different concepts of a regulatory "taking"'16 1 to realize
157. But see Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center v. Arft, 454 F. Supp.
784 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The court in .4/? refused to extend absolute immunity to the
local level, but failed to provide a supporting rationale.
158. See notes 52-84 and accompanying text supra.
159. 438 U.S. 478, 513-15 (1978).
160. Id. at 508.
161. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); EN-
VIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1973: THE FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 121-50 (1973). In the latter, the authors identify four tak-
ing theories used by courts. The first is the physical invasion theory. The effect of the
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how unclear the fundamental principles of zoning are. Finally,
courts must exercise caution in applying general rules that vary from
situation to situation. "When a governmental action is characterized
as 'legislative' or 'adjudicative,' there is the risk that the characteriza-
tion will be carried beyond the specific issue being decided."' 62
These general problems become readily apparent when one con-
siders the nature of specific local actions. Is a rezoning legislative,
judicial, or administrative in nature? Is the granting of a variance a
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative action? What is the charac-
ter of a planning commission's recommendation to the city council on
a proposed rezoning? This article does not seek to provide a defini-
tive answer to the questions of administrative, judicial, or legislative
classification (assuming that is even possible). Rather, this paper
merely seeks to show that the failure to provide adequate definitions
for local zoning actions may result in potentially serious problems
when a Section 1983 case arises in the land use area. These potential
problems become readily apparent when one examines both the
scholarly theories and judicial approaches to characterizing the na-
ture of the actions of local land use officials. 163
Commentators have identified several methods for deciding
challenged regulation is analogized to a physical appropriation or confiscation.
Under the nuisance and abatement theory, the zoning regulation is characterized as a
device to eliminate nuisance-like uses. Here, no compensation is required (Ze., no
taking occurs) if the challenged regulation prevents nuisance-like uses. The third the-
ory involves a balancing test: the public benefit is weighed against the private loss to
determine if a taking has occurred. Finally, the diminution of value theory holds that
a taking occurs when the regulation causes an excessive economic loss. The loss can
be measured in two ways. One can measure the extent of the loss in absolute terms.
Alternatively, one can measure the remaining economic value of the property.
162. Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Board of Comm'rs, 287 Or. 591, 602, 601 P.2d
769, 773 (1979).
163. See, e.g., Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) (legislative); Gorman
Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (legislative); Kinderhill
Farm Breeding Assocs. v. Appel, 450 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (executive or ad-
ministrative actions); Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237 (D.
Del. 1968) (legislative); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d
23 (1973) (judicial). See also Adelfio, Governmental Immunity from Zoning, 22 B.C.
L. REv. 783 (1981); Rockwell, Constitutional Violations in Zoning, The Emerging Sec-
tion 1983 Damage Remedy, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 168 (1981); Cunningham, Rezoning by
Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act. The "New Look in Michigan
Zoning", 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1975); Harris, Rezoning-ShouldIt Be a Legislative
or Judicial Function?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 409 (1979); Mandelker, Delegation of Power
and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60 (1963); Developments in
the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427 (1978).
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whether a local zoning action is legislative, administrative, or judi-
cial.' Most of these methods have developed from questions con-
cerning the procedural due process protection afforded owners of
property and to the scope of judicial review.' 65 Accordingly, the pri-
mary focus of these approaches is on the legislative versus adjudica-
tive or administrative function.166 One can distinguish this from the
Section 1983 characterization problem which primarily focuses upon
the administrative versus legislative or judicial functions. 167 Never-
theless, these approaches are useful in the 1983 context, since both
the procedural due process cases and the 1983 cases examine the ba-
sic nature of the actions of a local land use official.
In a 1978 Harvard Law Review survey of recent developments in
the law of zoning, 16 the authors distinguish three approaches utilized
in the procedural due process cases for deciding whether a zoning
action is legislative or administrative. First, some courts adopt the
view that the identity of the decisionmaking body determines the
character of an action. Thus, when a legislative body enacts legisla-
tion, it acts in a legislative fashion, regardless of the content of the
legislation. 69 Second, other courts simply label a zoning action as
judicial, legislative, or administrative and thereafter always classify
164. See, e.g., LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980); Harris, Rezoning-Should it be a Legislative or
Judicial Function?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 409 (1979); Mandelker, Delegation of Power
and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 601 (1963); Note, Civil
Rights Suits Against State and Local Government Entities and Officials Rights a/(Ac.
tions, Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945 (1980); Comment, Zoning
Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130
(1972).
165. See, e.g., Booth, A Realistic Examination of Rezoning Procedure: The Cam.
plementary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REV. 753
(1976); Sullivan, Araby Revisited" The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process
Before Land Use Regulating Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA L.J. 50 (1974).
166. See, e.g., Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or
Quasi-Judicial Act: The 'Wew Look in Michigan Zoning", 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341
(1975); Nott, Zoning Amendments-The Products of Judicial or Quasi-JudicialAction,
33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972).
167. See S. NAHMOD, supra, note 11, at 191-228 for a general discussion. The
Supreme Court made this distinction in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
168. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1427 (1978) (hereinafter
cited as Developments).
169. Id. at 1509, citing, Berg v. City of Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 198 N.E.2d 48
(1964); State ex rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417 (1934).
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that action similarly. Thus, a variance might always be classified as
an administrative action, whereas the adoption of a comprehensive
plan might always be legislative. 7 ' The third view distinguishes be-
tween general policy formulations (legislative) and specific applica-
tions of previously formulated policy (administrative). 171
The authors, noting problems with all three tests, 172 propose their
own two-part test. First, they would inquire whether the facts under-
lying the action are legislative. That is, whether they relate to gener-
alizations on a policy or state of affairs, rather than relating to specific
individuals or specific situations.' 73 The second inquiry is whether
the impacts of an action are general (legislative), or have differential
impact on specific individuals (administrative). For example, the de-
nial of a variance has a specific impact on a developer and thus is
administrative. The rezoning of land for an airport would be legisla-
tive since it would have a greater impact on some individuals than
others but would not affect specified individuals.
Some authors, however, classify zoning actions as legislative or ju-
dicial (or quasi-judicial).' 74 The authors of the Harvard Law Review
170. Developments, supra note 168, at 1509, citing, Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534
F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976); cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Dwyer v. City Council, 200
Cal, 505, 253 P. 932 (1927); Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1957); Wippler v.
Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 110 S.W.2d 409 (1937).
171. Developments, supra note 168, at 1509, citing, City of Bowie v. County
Comm'rs, 258 Md. 454, 267 A.2d 172 (1970); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319,75 N.W.2d
713 (1956); Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St.2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971); Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
172. Developments, supra note 168, at 1509-10. The authors reject the first test
because it permits the availability of procedural rights to turn on the legislative allo-
cation of zoning powers. The first and second tests share the defect of labeling certain
actions without inquiring into the surrounding circumstances. The third test is re-
jected because it "produces the anomalous result that a hearing would be granted
whenever a decision implemented previous policy, but could be denied whenever a
decision on a specific application is used to announce a new general policy." Id. at
1510. Indeed, this is what has happened using a variant of the third test in § 1983
actions. See Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118,
1136 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Kinderhill Farm Breeding Associates v. Appel, 450 F. Supp.
134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
173. Actions requiring a policy determination for resolution are characterized as
involving legislative questions. Actions presenting questions about the application of
policy to specific individuals or situations are said to involve administrative or adjudi-
cative questions. See Developments, supra note 168, at 1510, citing, I K. Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise §§ 7.02, -.06 (1958); Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type
Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1956).
174. See, e.g., Comment, Zoning Amendment-The Products of Judicial or Quasi-
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
article do not mention the possibility of zoning actions being judicial.
Similarily, the authors (and courts)1 75 that use the legislative-judicial
dichotomy typically do not give substantial consideration to classify-
ing zoning actions as administrative. From the point of view of most
authors, this distinction is not important. Their concern typically is
the question of procedural safeguards, and there are procedural safe-
guards that apply to both administrative and judicial actions that do
not apply to legislative actions.
Some authors and courts recognize the dichotomy, but are inclined
to use "administrative" and "quasi-judicial" interchangeably. This is
most notable in the report of the American Bar Association's Advi-
sory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth, 176 an otherwise
exemplary discussion of the character of local land use actions. Simi-
larly, some courts treat certain actions, usually called legislative, as
administrative. Other courts appear to treat the same actions as judi-
cial or quasi-judicial. This is not always just a difference in terminol-
ogy; courts may analyze facts differently. Thus, it is clear that courts
are far from uniform in characterizing local zoning actions.
It is beyond the scope of this article to try to answer why some
authors and cases seem to select one dichotomy over another rather
than to recognize a trichotomy (or fail to distinguish between admin-
istrative and quasi-judicial). Nevertheless, for Section 1983 purposes,
the differences can be crucial. Consider the actions of a Board of
Zoning Appeals (BZA) in granting a variance and a planning com-
mission in issuing a conditional use permit.177 One can make a good
intuitive argument that courts should consider a decision by a plan-
ning commission to issue the permit as administrative. It is granted
JudicialAction, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130 (1972) where the author lists the characteristics
distinguishing between legislative and quasi-judicial actions. Judicial action involves
specific situations, application of policy and retrospectivity. Legislative action is gen-
eral in scope, involves policy formulation and is prospective in nature. See also Har-
ris, Rezoning-Shouldit be a Legislative or Judicial Function, 31 BAYLOR L. RV. 409
(1979); Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial
Act 2he "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 1341 (1975).
175. Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 287 Or. 591, 601
P.2d 769 (1979); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973).
176. HOUsING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 263-280 (R. Fishman ed. 1978).
177. Assume that the permit will be final unless an appeal is taken to the city
counsel. Thus, the decision is that of the planning commission unless appealed. As-
sume also that appeals from the BZA are taken to court. In actuality, of course, this
will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
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by an administrative body. It is specific to one individual. There is
no policy being made; the planning commission is implementing leg-
islation. Theoretically at least, it is only the use of the owner's land
that is at issue. As long as he meets the standards of the ordinance,
his neighbors have no rights concerning his use of his land. 7 '
On an intuitive basis, the BZA action is more complicated to ana-
lyze. If a court views the action as administrative, the court will then
treat the BZA action in a fashion similar to that of the planning com-
mission. Conversely, if the court characterizes the action as judicial
or quasi-judicial, then the BZA members will enjoy absolute immu-
nity. There are sound reasons for viewing the BZA's action as ad-
ministrative. It is undertaken by an administrative body
implementing the zoning ordinance and affecting by its actions cer-
tain specific individuals. It is not judicial in the sense that one thinks
of a court case involving two sets of litigants in a formal lawsuit (even
though there may be a neighbor who is fighting the action). Nor is it
in the form of a criminal action where the public is bringing action
against an individual. The absence of these factors would argue for
labeling zoning variances as "administrative."
On the other hand, a variance is somewhat different from a condi-
tional use permit. Although the BZA is not passing legislation, it is
interpreting the limits of the zoning ordinance for the purpose of set-
ting the constitutional limits on city action, at least if it truly applies
the hardship test typically found in zoning ordinances. 179 Addition-
ally, unlike the planning commission, its decision is often truly final
and can frequently only be appealed through the judicial system.
These factors may well argue for a label of judicial rather than legis-
lative. However, reality intrudes at all times. While the BZA may
178. The question whether a decision is legislative, administrative, or judicial is
not to be wholly determined by whether the underlying facts are called legislative,
adjudicative, or even mixed legislative-adjudicative. For a discussion of legislative
and judicial facts, see citations at note 164.
179. Typically, zoning law permits the granting of a variance only on a showing
of unusual hardship, which can be interpreted to mean that the ordinance will be a
taking of property unless a variance is granted. See, e.g., Puritan-Greenfield Im-
provement Assoc. v. Leo, 7 Mich. App. 659, 153 N.W.2d 162 (1967); Otto v.
Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher,
278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). On the other hand, some ordinances permit a
variance on a showing of practical difficulties, which does not reach the constitutional
dimension. See, e.g., Palmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 287 A.2d 535 (D.C.
1972); Hoffman v. Harris, 17 N.Y.2d 138, 216 N.E.2d 326, 269 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1966);
Village of Bronxville v. Francis, I A.D. 2d 236, 150 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1956).
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well have a hardship standard to uphold, it would be foolish to fail to
recognize that many BZAs make decisions as if they were administra-
tive bodies. Thus, the real standard for a variance may well be, "Do
I think that the variance requested is a good one?" This argues more
strongly for a classification of administrative. A finding of "adminis-
trative" also accords with an intuitive feeling that the BZA and the
planning commission are both engaged in activities which, to some
extent, interpret and implement the zoning ordinance, and that while
appeal procedures may differ, the boards are both dealing (at least in
the situations mentioned) with individuals and affecting their specific
rights. As Professor Mandelker has noted, both boards play a role in
zoning administration. 80
Thus far, only two boards have been considered. When one con-
siders the number of different activities each engages in, and the
other boards, legislative bodies, and administrative officials that func-
tion in zoning, the true nature of the problem is made manifest. To
date, there are an insufficient number of clear cases to help one reach
a definitive answer for purposes of Section 1983. Nevertheless, the
next section examines the findings of the courts in order to begin to
piece together a rational approach to the problem.
1. The Courts Approach the Problem
The courts have generally been able to avoid the question of pre-
cisely defining what a zoning action is, but eventually they will have
to directly confront the problem in Section 1983 cases. The courts
that have examined the question under Section 1983 have either used
a policymaking-implementation distinction18' or a surface classifica-
tion of the type of action. 182 Few courts have used the complex
Harvard Law Review test 8 3 or the simplistic identity of the decision-
making body text. 18 4
One court used the decisionmaking body test as a factor in deter-
mining the Section 1983 liability of land use officials. In Centennial
Land and Development Co. v. Township of Medford,8 5 the court con-
180. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning.Administration, 1963
WASH. U. L.Q. 60.
181. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
182. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 173 and accompanying text supra.
184. See note 169 and accompanying text supra.
185. 165 N.J. Super. 220, 397 A.2d 1136 (1979).
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cluded that members of planning and zoning boards share enough of
the characteristics of judges that their actions should be considered
quasi-judicial and the members, therefore, subject to absolute immu-
nity. 8 6 Factors the court relied upon included findings that state law
set fixed terms of office, prohibited the holding of simultaneous elec-
tive office, prohibited removal of a member except for cause after a
public hearing, prohibited conflicts of interest, and, in the case of
board of zoning appeals officials at least, required a degree objectiv-
ity related to that of judges."8 7 The Centennial court, however, did
look to other factors in addition to the characteristics of the decision-
making body.' 88
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States,189 however, the Supreme Court rejected a pure decisionmak-
ing body test in a Section 1983 case. In Consumers Union, the issues
revolved around the constitutionality of a state bar code prohibiting
attorney advertising after a United States Supreme Court decision
declaring such prohibitions unconstitutional. 9 The Supreme Court
of Virginia, charged with the responsibility to prepare state bar rules,
refused to change the state rule after the Supreme Court's decision.
Consumers Union requested, inter alia, that the members of the Vir-
ginia court be required to pay attorneys' fees as a result of their re-
fusal to conform the bar code to the United States Supreme Court
ruling. 19
1
The Supreme Court examined the nature of the state court's
rulemaking powers and held that the Virginia Supreme Court, in es-
186. Id. at 230, 397 A.2d 1141.
187. Id.
188. The court examined both public policy and common law tradition. Id. at
224, 397 A.2d at 1138. In discussing public policy, the court balanced the public's
interest in compensation for a wrong they have suffered and society's interest in pro-
tecting public servants for liability resulting from error in job performance. The court
recognized that zoning officials make decisions that significantly affect a community.
Without immunity, the court believed it would be difficult to attract qualified people
to positions on zoning boards. Id. at 227, 397 A.2d at 1140.
The court also discussed the procedural safeguards that apply to zoning hearings.
Finding that the safeguards in zoning hearings were similar to those in judicial pro-
ceedings, the court concluded that zoning officials are entitled to absolute immunity.
Id. at 232, 397 A.2d at 1142.
189. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
190. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
191. 446 U.S. at 729.
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tablishing rules for attorneys, acted in a legislative capacity. 192 The
Court consequently found the members of the state court absolutely
immune from liability. 93 The Supreme Court rejected the view that
the formal organizational structure of the decisionmaking body is de-
terminative.' 94 The Court also rejected the contention that absolute
immunity did not obtain since legislative authority had been dele-
gated to a non-legislative body. 195
The Supreme Court noted, however, that state court judges are not
absolutely immune when administering the bar code. Thus, judges
do not have absolute immunity when exercising their own independ-
ent enforcement authority by initiating proceedings against attor-
neys.196 In so holding, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a
single body-here the Virginia Supreme Court---can act in judicial,
legislative, and administrative capacities. Accordingly, the decision-
making body test, by itself, appears to have little viability.
Cases involving the liability of non-legislative and non-judicial of-
ficials for legislative, administrative, and judicial acts also illustrate
the preference for characterization tests that look beyond the identity
of the decisionmaking body. One has to look at the kind of action
the official is engaged in to determine whether there is any immunity.
The question is somewhat complicated because many activities of lo-
cal planning officials do not involve final decisionmaking, but rather
involve advising the legislative body. This may include such actions
as making recommendations for rezoning by the planning commis-
sion or recommendations for plat approval. It is safe to conclude,
although there is little direct case law on the point, that in such in-
stances the board members receive the immunity granted to the final
decisionmaker.
In one case that considered the issue directly, ralin & Waldron,
Inc. v. County of Henrico, Virginia,97 the court held that where the
planning commission makes recommendations on pending legisla-
tion, it is engaged in legislative activity. The court reasoned that the
commission's recommendation is an integral step in enacting zoning
legislation.
192. Id. at 731.
193. Id. at 734.
194. Id. at 724.
195. Id. at 731-34.
196. Id. at 736.
197. 474 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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This type of reasoning has indirect support in some of the Supreme
Court's decisions. Thus, in Butz v. Economu, the Supreme Court in-
dicated that significant participants in a particular process are enti-
tled to certain immunities pertaining to that process: "Absolute
immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and wit-
nesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or
intimidation."' 8 In discussing the immunities of hearing examiners,
the Court noted their power to "make or recommend" decisions.' 9
Where the process requires the assistance of others, whether commis-
sion members or staff, or where the position of others in, for example,
the legislative process is critical, then it is reasonable to apply the
same immunities to the recommending bodies and officers as to the
decisionmakers.
Enacting zoning legislation is a multi-stage affair. It involves rec-
ommendations by staff or planning consultants, recommendations by
a planning body (accompanied by a hearing), and a final decision by
the city council or other relevant legislative body. If the process is to
have internal integrity, then one cannot treat the decisionmaker dif-
ferent from other participants. If the legislator obtains absolute im-
munity, then the others should as well. If the legislator receives only
qualified immunity, then the others should be treated in a similar
fashion.2 °
Instead of using the identity of the decisionmaking body test, many
courts base their characterization on an examination of the particular
action and determine that the action is of one type or another. This
surface characterization presents several problems.
First, states disagree as to whether zoning actions are legislative,
executive, or judicial. In fact, courts even disagree over whether they
should treat specific zoning actions in the same fashion. For exam-
ple, some courts have held that an initial comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance is legislative in nature, but that rezoning conducted, as it is, on
a piecemeal basis, is not.2"' Similarly, a distinction may be made
198. 438 U.S. at 512.
199. 438 U.S. at 513. This may perhaps be stretching the point a bit because the
Court also emphasized the independence of federal hearing examiners. Nonetheless,
many hearing examiners do play their major role in the recommendation of decisions
and this is of course what planning commissioners do in matters of local land-use
decisions.
200. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-18 (1972).
201. Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); Cooper v.
Board of County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980); Donnelly v.
19821
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
between a comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance or variances
referring to specific parcels.2"2
Second, even where courts do not make such fine distinctions, they
still face the question of how to characterize the action. On this mat-
ter state courts are not in universal agreement. The majority of
courts that have considered the question have concluded that rezon-
ings are legislative in nature.20 3 This was the case in Robinson v. City
of Raytown,2" where the city board of aldermen rezoned property
from multi-family to single-family, allegedly without giving adequate
notice and without holding a proper hearing. The court denied a
finding of liability on the grounds that a rezoning was a legislative
action.2"5 Likewise, the majority of federal courts have held rezon-
ings to be legislative actions. 206 Moreover, one case has held that a
mayor vetoing a zoning ordinance is engaging in a legislative action
where zoning is a legislative activity.207
City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968); Barrie v. Kitsap, 84
Wash. 2d 579, 527 P.2d 1377 (1974); Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d
327 (1972).
202. See the dissent of Justice Stevens in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters.,
426 U.S. 668, 683-91 (1976) and cases cited therein. The idea here is that a compre-
hensive zoning plan is legislative in nature because it is general and applicable
throughout the jurisdiction. A rezoning, on the other hand, may not be legislative
because it is specific to one parcel. Moreover, a rezoning, while done by the legisla-
tive body, requires the sort of expertise that one finds in an administrator (and hence
the typical planning commission role of advising the legislative body on rezonings).
203. See Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137
Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1957); City of Coral
Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Hall Paving Co. v.
Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 226 S.E. 2d 728 (1976); Mahoney Grease Serv. v. City of
Joliet, 85 IMI. App. 3d 578, 406 N.E.2d 911 (1980); Kirk v. Tyrone Township, 398
Mich. 429, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976); Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202
N.W.2d 892 (1972); Wippler v. Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 110 S.W.2d 409 (1937); Robinson
v. City of Raytown, 606 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Lanton v. City of Austin,
404 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
204. 606 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
205. Id. at 466.
206. See Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613-14 (8th Cir.
1980); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (E.D.
Va. 1979), affd 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980); Bruce v. Riddle, 464 F. Supp. 745, 746-
48 (D.S.C. 1979); Legon v. Maryland, 448 F. Supp. 935, 947-48 (D. Md. 1977); Shan-
non Fredericksburg Motor Inn v. Hicks, 434 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va. 1977); Shellburne
Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237 (D. Del. 1968).
207. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
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Some courts, however, have chosen to characterize rezonings as ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial in nature. The most important line of cases
has arisen in Oregon and relates to the scope of judicial review con-
cerning the conformity of zoning ordinances to a comprehensive
plan. In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners2' 8 the Supreme
Court of Oregon held that not all local zoning acts were legislative in
nature. Ordinances which lay down general policies could be legisla-
tive, but "a determination whether the permissible use of a specific
piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial
authority .. ."' While the Fasano decision involved a different
(non-1983) context, it is relevant for Section 1983 decisions. The
Fasano doctrine is not limited to Oregon, but has been followed in
other states.210
Some jurisdictions have found a rezoning decision to be adminis-
trative in nature, and, of course, this is likely to open the door to
potential Section 1983 lawsuits.2 " This was the case in Gorman Tow-
ers v. Bogoslavsky,212 where the court in a rezoning case found that
the issue was not raised and therefore not appropriate for review.
The court, however, noted in a footnote that while zoning is ordina-
rily a legislative act,213 one could argue that zoning was an adminis-
trative function. The court cited Justice Stevens' dissent in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 2 14 to the effect that several
state courts have considered rezoning to be quasi-judicial or adminis-
trative in nature.
Surface characterization of an action as legislative, executive, or
judicial is only one way of approaching the problem. Courts have
208. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
209. Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 26.
210. See Cooper v. City & County of Denver, 191 Colo. 252, 552 P.2d 13 (1976);
Colorado Springs v. District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 519 P.2d 325 (1974); Cooper v.
Board of County Comm'rs., 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980); Kropf v. Sterling
Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974). But see Kirk v. Tyrone Township,
398 Mich. 429, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976). The Fasano doctrine has also been specifi-
cally rejected. See Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d
467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Hall Paving Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 226
S.E.2d 728 (1976).
211. See Bowie v. County Comm'rs., 258 Md. 454, 267 A.2d 172 (1970); Kelley v.
John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 7813 (1956); Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11,
271 N.E.2d 864 (1971); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
212. 626 F.2d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1980).
213. Id. at 611 n.5, citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4, 9 (1974).
214. 426 U.S. 668, 683-85 (1976).
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indicated that they will look to the substance of the action rather than
to its form. Thus, regardless of how courts originally classify a par-
ticular action, there may well be other factors that suggest the sub-
stance of the act. For example, where zoning proceedings appear to
be legislative, rigorous procedural requirements may make the action
more like a judicial or administrative activity. Thus, there may be
hearing requirements, procedural requirements or notice, and other
rules more appropriate to an administrative proceeding than to a leg-
islative action. For example, in CentennialLandandDepelopment Co.
v. Township ofMedford21 5 the court considered the characteristics of
the proceedings, concluding that judicial procedures were appropri-
ate to these boards. Planning and zoning boards were required to
hold public hearings on development proposals, and the hearings
were subject to the requirements of a state open hearings law. Fur-
ther, the presiding officer was authorized to administer oaths and is-
sue subpoenas and all witnesses were subject to cross examination by
any interested party. The Board had to reduce its decisions to writ-
ing, provide reasons for its conclusions, and publish its decisions in
an official newspaper. The court concluded that the Boards' actions
were quasi-judicial in nature And found applicable the public policy
interests that protect judges in similar cases.
In reaching its decision, the court in CentennialLand relied heavily
on Butz v. Economou, arguing that Economou placed an emphasis on
the safeguards built into the position at issue.216 The court viewed
this as a fundamental change from Wood v. Strickland.217 Neverthe-
less, the court referred to language in Wood finding qualified immu-
nity appropriate where absolute "immunity would not sufficiently
increase the ability of school officials to exercise their discretion in
forthright manner. '  The court felt that for planning and zoning
board members, the presence of absolute immunity would make a
difference.
The court's reliance upon Economou seems misplaced. First, the
controls on irregular action are only one facet of the overall Econo-
mou analysis and there is no indication in Economou that the Court
intended this factor to be definitive. Additionally, to rely on the ex-
215. 165 N.J. Super. 220, 397 A.2d 1136 (1979). See text accompanying note 185
.upra.
216. 165 N.J. Super. at 229, 397 A.2d at 1141.
217. Id. at 233, 397 A.2d at 1143.
218. Id. at 233, 397 A.2d at 1142.
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tent of control test to this degree means that one is likely to reach
different conclusions about planning and zoning boards where such
restrictions do not exist, even though these boards may be performing
similar tasks.
Finally, several courts appear to accept the policy-implementation
distinction. For example, Alder Y. Lynch2" 9 involved a refusal by the
elected legislative Board of County Commissioners, functioning as a
board of adjustment, to grant a variance. Quite obviously rejecting
the view that the nature of the body undertaking the action deter-
mined the character of the action, the court argued that in this situa-
tion the elected officials were not engaging in legislative activity. The
court found that the officials were not conceiving "public policy from
the myriad policy options open to the soverign."22  Rather, the court
believed that the Board's action was similar to actions of other offi-
cials who exercise limited discretion. The court believed that the ac-
tions of zoning officials in a variance case, while somewhat broader
than the actions of the school officials in Wood, were sufficiently sim-
ilar to warrant only qualified immunity.221
A federal district court adopted this view in Three Rivers Cablevi-
sion v. City of Pittsburgh,222 a case involving the city council's grant
of a cable franchise. The court held that legislative acts are broad
policy statements "establishing guidelines by which the future con-
duct of an entire group of persons falling within a particular classifi-
cation will be judged." '223 Executive acts consisted of the application
of legislation to the circumstances. The Harvard authors may disap-
prove of the wording of the decision since it involved adopting a view
they believed caused difficulties. The decision appears to permit ab-
solute immunity for the zoning action taken.224 However, the cir-
cumstances in Three Rivers would seem to justify a similar outcome
under either test.
219. 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976).
220. Id. at 712.
221. The court did refer to the actions of school board officials as quasi-judicial,
but this occurred before Economou changed the emphasis from extent of discretion,
which was important to the Adler court, to the functional analogy approach. None-
theless, it is clear that the Adler court felt that the variance action was similar to
executive acts. Id. at 712.
222. 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
223. Id. at 1136.
224. See text at note 224 infra.
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The United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach,
although its articulation of the standard is not sufficiently developed
to provide a clear path through the thicket. Nonetheless, the Court in
Consumers Union225 in rejecting the identity of the decisionmaking
body test, adopted a policymaking-implementation distinction. The
Court, quoting from a dissent in the District Court, stated that:
Disciplinary rules are rules of general application and are stat-
utory in character. They act not on parties litigant, but on all
those who practice law in Virginia. They do not arise out of a
controversy which must be adjudicated, but instead out of a
need to regulate conduct for the protection of all citizens. It is
evident that, in enacting disciplinary rules, the Supreme Court of
Virginia is constituted a legislature.226
The Supreme Court agreed that the Virginia court, in establishing
rules for attorneys, acted in a legislative capacity and leaving its abso-
lutely immune from liability.227 As mentioned earlier, the Court also
noted that state court judges are not absolutely immune in their en-
forcement capacities when they administer the bar code.228
While the Court helped to clarify some questions, it did not pro-
vide enough analytical scaffolding to indicate clearly how it will ex-
amine other kinds of cases when they arise. For example, the
decision suggests that the passing of general legislation is legislative
while the administration of legislation is administrative. There is no
clear indication that the Court will treat the enactment of very spe-
cific legislation, such as a rezoning, as administrative. It would ap-
pear from the decision that the Court will adopt a very pragmatic,
factually oriented approach, but that too is uncertain. Nor does the
Court speak to the reliance by the New Jersey courts on the impor-
tance of procedural safeguards as determining whether absolute im-
munity is available. As noted above, in Centennial Land and
Development Co. v. Townshp of M~edford229 a New Jersey court held
many of the cases finding qualified immunity for local 6ffi~ials
wrongly decided because they relied on Wood's language that offi-
225. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
226. Id. at 731, quoting, Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar As-
soc., 470 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (E.D. Va. 1979) (Warriner, J., dissenting).
227. 446 U.S. at 731-32.
228. Id. at 736.
229. 165 N.J. Super. 220, 397 A.2d 1136 (1979). See text accompanying notes
185-88 supra.
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cials exercising discretion should receive only qualified immunity un-
less they required absolute immunity to exercise their discretion.23 °
According to the New Jersey court, Wood's finding that a school
board official has qualified immunity did not apply to a zoning board
member because in the latter situation there were rigorous proce-
dures that made such cases quasi-judicial.231 The New Jersey court
emphasized language in Economou relating to the importance of pro-
cedural safeguards as determinative.232 At present, it appears that
the New Jersey court is out of line with the other decisions, including
Consumers Union, which appear to consider the principal decision-
making factor to be whether or not the action speaks to legislative
activities. The existence of procedural safeguards, under this analy-
sis, would be a factor, but only a factor, in most cases.
Courts granting absolute immunity to legislative officials for zon-
ings have held that persons implementing or enforcing the acts are
only entitled to qualified immunity. In Fralin & Waldon, Inc. v.
County of Henrico, Virginia,233 the court found that while planning
commission members were immume from suit when they recommend
zoning legislation, these same commission members were only quali-
fiedly immune when enforcing the legislation.234 In Fralin, the legis-
lation downzoned an area and the planning commission
subsequently refused to approve a plan for low- and moderate-in-
come housing because of the legislation. The court also applied the
same double standard to the secretary of the planning commission,
who was held absolutely immume with respect to the downzoning
but not the enforcement action.235
The question arises whether to distinguish among different types of
230. Id. at 233, 397 A.2d at 1143.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 474 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1979).
234. Id. at 1321.
235. Fralin involved a discrimination suit which, under the doctrine of Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), required a show-
ing of intent to discriminate before a constitutional violation could be found. This
means that in Fralin, the finding of a violation would be tantamount to a finding that
defendants would be liable under § 1983, and, of course, not liable if there is no un-
derlying violation. A similar situation occurred in German v. Killeen, 495 F. Supp.
822 (E.D. Mich. 1980), and cases cited therein. However, given that a § 1983 action
can be brought for a violation of the Fair Housing Act, which may require intent to
discriminate, a violation of § 1983 can be proven without a lesser showing than an
showing of intent, Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
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permit actions. Thus, while the Fralin situation may not result in
absolute immunity, should other types of permits, such as zoning var-
iances, entitle the decisionmakers to such immunity? Initially, it is
fair to note that the same types of definitional problems arise here
that have arisen in the case of the question of absolute immunity for
legislative actions. Many would be inclined to make a distinction be-
tween, for example, the granting of a variance and the refusal to issue
a development permit or the refusal to approve a conditional use per-
mit. The latter, it may be argued, are administrative, while the role
of the board of zoning appeals in granting or not granting a variance
is a form of quasi-judicial action. Under this analysis, one may ex-
pect courts to grant absolute immunity for variance actions. This
may not necessarily prove to be the case. In Adler v. Lynch, 236 the
court concluded that the variance action was so closely constrained
by state law that qualified immunity should govern in this situa-
tion."37 This decision was cited with approval in Kinderhill Farm
Breeding Associates v. Appel,238 where the court "found no federal
case holding the grant or denial of a permit to be legislative activity
entitled to absolute protection. .. ,,2 The Harvard Law Review ar-
ticle supports this position "because a variance decision normally
produces a differential impact and because it will usually be made on
the basis of administrative facts best known by the applicant and his
neighbors.' -4 Using this or some similar test makes sense because it
captures what seems to be the nature of a variance decision. In addi-
tion, it provides a consistent pattern for other administrative deci-
sions, such as the issuance of conditional use permits or the approval
of subdivision plats. These actions are certainly administrative in na-
ture and it makes little sense to treat variance actions, however theo-
retically different, in a contrary fashion.241 BZA variance decisions
are based on specific facts, tend to create differential effects, and are
often subject to the same procedures, including notice, hearing, and
1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 429 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
236. 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976).
237. Id. at 712.
238. 450 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
239. Id. at 136.
240. Developments, supra note 168, at 1512.
241. This is especially true when one considers how frequently boards of zoning
appeals decide cases on what they think is appropriate without regard to the strict
standards which may govern their actions.
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so forth.242
In addition to the more specific kinds of actions, local officials also
make decisions that are more general in nature. This includes items
such as the passage of a comprehensive plan (which may or may not
be enacted into law by the legislature) and broad policy recommen-
dations for development of large areas of the municipality. Here, if
these officials are to be held liable for mere recommendations, it
makes sense to accord them absolute immunity, using a functional
approach to the question. Of course, in the sense of applying exper-
tise to the solution of certain problems, they are functioning very
much in the manner of administrators.
Unfortunately, the uncertain situation concerning differing state
characterization of local actions is likely to persist for at least a while.
Thus, the Supreme Court needs to address the relationship between
state court pronouncements as to the characterization of certain ac-
tions and the uniform practice of Section 1983 law. The question of
characterization of any particular action-whether it is zoning, subdi-
vision, granting of a variance, or whatever-depends on the state
court's initial analysis of that action. Typically, federal courts have
either accepted the uncontested state court characterization or ac-
cepted prior state court characterization without further inquiry.243
Many characterization questions have a strong factual component.
If courts are going to perform the more sophisticated analysis sug-
gested above, they will frequently be delving into factual issues such
as whether any particular action has broad policy implications, or
whether there are procedural limitations surrounding individual ac-
tions. Such questions raise legal and factual issues and for the most
part, it would be reasonable for federal courts to be circumspect in
establishing general principles here.
However, there are legal limits as well. Consider two suits filed in
two states on rezonings from commercial to residential where plain-
tiffs allege that the rezonings constitute an unlawful taking of prop-
erty. If plaintiffs in both states sue under Section 1983 and both cases
242. There is one major area of difference and that is that appeals from a variance
decision will typically go to the local courts, whereas appeals from, say, a conditional
use decision will go the city's legislative body. This, by itself, would not seem to
change the nature of the action from administrative to judicial, although it might be a
factor.
243. See, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611, n.5 (8th
Cir. 1980).
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reach the United States Supreme Court at the same time, the Court
will be forced to reach some consistent principles for decision where
the two state courts take different views on the nature of rezoning.
Thus, reliance upon state characterization raises a question of insur-
ing that federal policy prevails where state interpretation might make
consistent application of Section 1983 rights impossible. This is a se-
rious problem, especially since the purpose of Section 1983 is to vin-
dicate victims suffering from deprivations of underlying
constitutional or federal rights.
The question of state policy defeating federal policy has arisen in a
few cases involving procedural issues. In Marrapese v. State of Rhode
Island,24 a federal district court considered whether a federal or
state discovery rule should apply in a Section 1983 action. In Mar-
rapese, the plaintiff claimed that despite a three year state statute of
limitations, the court should allow him to bring suit after five years
since he only was able then to discover the harm. The court dis-
cussed a recent United States Supreme Court case, Board ofRegents
v. Tomanio,245 which had held that in Section 1983 actions federal
courts should follow state tolling rules. Nonetheless, the Marrapese
court concluded that federal law should govern questions of accrual
because otherwise unjust action would go unpunished in spite of fed-
eral policy.24 A state statute of limitations only determines how long
someone has to bring suit-the federal policy is still enforceable; a
discovery rule that shuts out application of the policy, however, pre-
vents recovery unjustly. The Marrapese court relied on the Tomanio
case for the authority that "federal courts may disregard an otherwise
applicable state law if the law is 'inconsistent with the federal policy
underlying the cause of action under consideration.' "247 Other fed-
eral courts have reached a similar conclusion.248
Although the Tomanio and Marrapese cases address judicial and
procedural issues, there should be no difference in substantive inter-
pretations of the actions of local officials. It is the action, not the
244. 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D. R.I. 1980).
245. 446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980).
246. 500 F. Supp. at 1226.
247. Id., quoting Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980) and
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).
248. See Lavallee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980); Briley v. California, 564
F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977); Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976); Cox v. Stan-
ton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975).
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name, that counts: "[T]he fact that a State may give. . . a 'legisla-
tive' label should not save an otherwise invalid procedure." '249 Like-
wise, the name given an action by a state court should not affect the
Section 1983 rights of potential litigants. This problem is an impor-
tant one and it is to be hoped that the courts will consider it more
carefully as cases arise in the future.
2. A Few Words of Caution
The uncertainties indicated by the analysis above-the difficulties
of classification of local land use actions and the potentially ambigu-
ous role of the federal courts--suggest caution in trying to develop
precise classifications usable in Section 1983 analysis. This caution is
further justified in the light of some general considerations.
First, the search for unambiguous classifications of actions runs
into some serious problems of a generic nature. In the past, most
courts have not had to classify actions precisely. As indicated, it
made no difference whether courts considered an action administra-
tive, judicial, quasi-judicial, or anything else as long as it was not
legislative. This lack of necessity to classify zoning actions precisely
also exists in classification problems in general. As the Administra-
tive Law article in California Jurisprudence 3d notes, "[I]t is fre-
quently difficult if not impossible to place a particular power or
function in a single category and seldom necessary to do so."25' The
article does attempt to provide some key to the meaning of adminis-
trative and executive, i e., "carrying out a legislatively completed pol-
icy" or "involving legislative discretions as to policy in completing
and perfecting the legislative process." 25' However, beyond that
statement, the article concludes that aside from meaning "not judi-
cial," the term "administrative" is frequently incapable of precise
meaning.25 2 This suggests that the typical designation of an action
may not be a simple task and that any analysis is likely to result in
difficulties if done on the basis of some prior theory without sensitiv-
ity to all the aspects of the particular situation.
249. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 686 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The procedure in question in City ofEastlake was the requirement of a
referendum on zoning amendments.
250. 2 CAL. JUR. 3d,,Admrnistrative Law § 43. The author is indebted to Professor
Earl Murphy of the Ohio State University School of Law for discussions on this point.
251. Id. at § 45.
252. Id. at § 43.
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Second, other broad considerations make categorization very diffi-
cult. On the one hand, legislative bodies typically grant to courts the
power to decide legal issues. They may, however, also delegate that
power to administrative bodies to interpret the law. Looking at the
land use decisions of local bodies from this perspective, courts un-
doubtedly have a strong tendency to consider many local actions as
being of a judicial nature. Under this view, such actions are very
different from administrative actions involving the giving of grants or
the investigation by the police of a reported crime. No one can deny
that there is a strong element of judicial decision-making in many of
the local land use decisions.
At the same time, however, as has already been noted in reference
to Professor Mandelker's article,253 the boards that make decisions in
the planning and land use area constitute a peculiar institutional ar-
rangement that functions in many respects as a major segment of the
administrative framework for the local planning process. Mandelker
notes that, as originally conceived, planning commissions and boards
of zoning appeals were merely a "supporting cast" '254 for the zoning
ordinance, but that the complicated expectations raised by the zoning
ordinance "requires delicate adjustments among competing land
uses. These adjustments cannot always be made before the fact." '255
Thus, Mandelker finds that the local boards have become a promi-
nent feature of the actual administration of zoning. Administration
was not to be left simply to the zoning inspector.
To the extent, then, that a local land use board is functioning as an
administrative agency in fact, there will be a feeling that its functions
ought to be classified as administrative rather than judicial.
These broad considerations of course reinforce the view discussed
earlier that many actions may have characteristics of several classifi-
cations of activity. '56 Any claim of immunity under Section 1983
may well defy the neat classification Section 1983 analysis seems to
imply. This makes the application of Section 1983 law especially dif-
ficult in the land use field.
253. Mandelker, Delegation ofPower and Function in Zoning 4dministration, 1963
WASH. U. L.Q. 60.
254. Id. at 63.
255. Id.
256. See notes 240-42 and accompanying text supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Section 1983 law has been shaped, as is all law, by logic and by the
accident of circumstance. Since relatively few land use cases involve
Section 1983, most of the law has come from other situations. While
there is no reliable statistical data, one commentator, Peter Schuck,
believes that a reliable study will show that most Section 1983 de-
fendants are police officers, prison officials, public school officials,
welfare officials, and public officials acting as employers. 7 In an
interesting point, he goes on to say that these officials "personally and
directly deliver the most basic governmental services to a public that
is often hostile or needy (or both), and they exercise substantial dis-
cretion in doing so."25'
Thus, most Section 1983 law suits involve low level bureaucrats
and not high level public officials. Scheuer v. Rhodes,25 9 a case
against the governor of Ohio, obviously indicates that this is not en-
tirely the case. Nevertheless, planning decisions are often made by
individuals who have different responsibilities and interact with the
public, not as a "street level bureaucrat, 260 nor even as a high level
administrator, but rather as a citizen volunteer on a planning board
of some type or as a local legislator engaging in administrative or
legislative decisions. These officials do not need to serve as a police-
man needs his position. They are quite likely to be upset at the possi-
bility of suits that may subject them to damage judgments, court and
lawyers' expenses, and a great deal of unsettling uncertainty, even if
they are held to be immune or not liable.261
Anyone who has ever talked to a group of local officials about Sec-
tion 1983 can understand this. Indeed, Schuck argues that "no em-
pirical question is more central to an evaluation of official immunity,
257. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress and the Liability ofPublic
Officialsfor Damages, Sup. CT. REv. 281, 293 (Kurland, Casper, & Hutchinson ed.
1980).
258, Id.
259. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
260. See LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980). Cf. Schuck, supra note 257, at 294.
261. One commentator, Martin Jaron, Jr., believes that it is very difficult to win a
§ 1983 lawsuit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Jaron, The Threat of
Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does it Interere with the Per-
formance ofState and Local Government? 13 URBAN LAW. 1 (1981). But it is also the
threat of a suit and difficulties connected with it which create concern in the minds of
officials potentially subject to suit.
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liability rules than this: how do public officials actually perceive and
evaluate the risk of incurring these costs?" '62 Schuck is perhaps
overstating the case because the equally important empirical ques-
tions are how Section 1983 liability affects the character of decision-
making and how the liability affects the attitude of citizens toward
their officials. However, the existence of liability undoubtedly will
have some major effect on an individual's actions and his willingness
to serve on governmental bodies. Whereas a policeman may tend to
respond by not acting or by responding "by the book," a planning
commission member may well decide to resign. Thus, not only the
quality of our public decisions, but also the character of our public
servants may be affected. If local governments can find and provide
adequate insurance policies for local officials, the situation will be
relieved. Or, if the local government indicates it will cover all costs,
including damage awards, suffered by citizen bureaucrats, then this
too will be of value. But the extent of availability of insurance poli-
cies is unclear and they tend to be costly and issued by only a few
263companies.
Some doubt also exists as to the coverage of general liability poli-
cies with respect to civil rights actions. To date, only a few cases have
decided the question and they are inconsistent and insufficient in
number to be definitive.2 4 Presumably, in the future, insurance
companies will be more likely either to exclude coverage for civil
rights actions to avoid escalating liability or provide specific policies
for civil rights actions.
The existence of insurance coverage, however, is not entirely a pos-
262. Schuck, supra note 247, at 307. Schuck details the types of conduct which
arise when risk aversion becomes a significant factor. These include inaction, delayed
actions, formulations and changes in the character of decisions.
263. The author is a member of a municipal planning commission for the City of
Worthington. The Ohio city recently purchased liability insurance for its zoning
board and planning commission members. The city manger, David Elder, indicated
in a conversation that it was difficult to locate a policy that provided such coverage.
Unfortunately, the author is unaware of any study on insurance for local government
officials in cases of adverse § 1983 judgments. Thus, the comments expressed here are
based on limited personal knowledge. The problem is undoubtedly widespread,
however.
264. See Rolette County v. Western Casulaty and Ins. Co., 452 F. Supp. 125 (D.
N.D. 1978) (no coverage, but the application to 1983 action is uncertain because no
coverage at all has been allowed under the policy); Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (coverage found). For details, see Platter & Baker,
Yhe Status of Personal Liability and Comprehensive General labiliy Insurance Cover-
age of Civil Rights Damage, INSURANCE COUNCIL JOURNAL 259 (April 1981).
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itive feature. While it undoubtedly will relieve local officials of a fear
of government service, it also creates other problems. Specifically, it
relieves local officials of the risk that Section 1983 imposes and
spreads that risk among the general population. This could make the
threat of Section 1983 actions meaningless. In this case, the only
remedy a local government has is removal of the official-not a great
deterrent to unprincipled behavior if the official is an unpaid or low-
paid commissioner or board member. Of course, removal of a paid
planning employee would be very effective. If the official is an
elected official, removal would have to be accomplished at the polls.
The question of insurance in such actions thus raises important pol-
icy questions that need to be studied.
Nor do municipalities typically give a "hold-harmless" pledge to
their public servants. In most cases, the situation remains ambigu-
ous. This is so not only because the city wishes to keep its options
open, but also perhaps because to give such assurances could result in
some officials acting without sufficient restraint. The municipality al-
ways has the remedy of removal, however. Nevertheless, until the
courts work out the liability rules, this problem will remain.265
Beyond the question of official response under uncertain law, un-
certainty also exists regarding how courts will interpret the law in the
land use context. Cases have raised the question of how to character-
ize land-use decisions for Section 1983 purposes. One of the acci-
dents of circumstances, however, is that up until now, most courts
have generally not had to deal with these questions. Further, when
they have, it has usually been in the non-1983 context of deciding
whether procedural restraints and practices suffice to render a deci-
sion administrative or judicial rather than legislative. When looking
at the issue from this point of view, courts may well tend to empha-
size those restraints; that is, courts often consider these procedural
safeguards as a favorable aspect of the local decision-making process
265. This article is not a guide to planning officials on how to reduce their liabil-
ity. There are, however, obvious ways to do so without unduly compromising the
quality of decisionmaking. The incidence of due process claims may be reduced by
following consistent procedures, by providing adequate reasons for the decisions, and
by being careful to treat different parties in the same manner. Given the deference
courts traditionally extend to substantive decisions by local governments, it is unlikely
that official conduct will be declared unpermissible if local authorities act properly.
This fact is not limited to § 1983 lawsuits, but applies equally to suits seeking to over-
turn local decisions on other grounds.
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since they protect the public and, usually, at little relative cost.2 6 6
However, in Section 1983 cases, there is reason to favor the oppo-
site approach-to call things legislative or judicial rather than admin-
istrative in order to avoid official liability. From the point of view of
the public servant and his government, the rules allowing liability of
an interpretation of "administrative" are very significant indeed.
Moreover, unlike the requirements of notice and public hearing, the
existence of Section 1983 liability may well change the character of
public decisions so as to result in a poorer governmental process.
This, then, is an area the courts must come to grips with. Now,
more than ever, courts have reason to grapple with the characteriza-
tion of local zoning actions. Unfortunately, the problem is also com-
plicated by the local nature of zoning as compared with the federal
character of Section 1983. To have the federal courts make such de-
terminations for the states because of a non-land-use federal law,
raises the spector of considerable, state-federal controversy. On the
other hand, to allow the state courts to define an action may well
result in chaos in the interpretation of Section 1983. The federal
courts have long had an involvement in decisions relating to police,
school officials, welfare workers, and the like. Except for issues of
exclusion and related questions, however, they have refrained from
evaluating ldcal zoning decisions. To vindicate Section 1983 rights,
federal courts may, at least to some extent, become more involved in
the local zoning process. Of course, many kinds of cases will arise
where the definition may not matter. Additionally, a court can avoid
the problem by treating the issue as a factual question peculiar to the
circumstances of that case. A court may well find that states have
sufficiently different rules and procedural requirements to justify the
differing interpretations states give to land use actions. Given the
ability of courts to avoid conflict of a direct kind, federal court reac-
tion of this nature can be expected.267
The next-five years or so will be critical. The possible outcomes
raise no small differences. They can affect the character of land use
decisions, the type of people and bodies who make them, and the
relationship between state and federal courts. It may seem a case of
266. At least this is so compared to the various hurdles which may have to be
jumped in the development process. See, e.g., Hagman, Vesting Issue: The Rights of
Fetal Development Vis-A- Vfi the Abortions of Public Whimsy, 7 ENVTL. L. 519 (1977).
267. Of course, the Supreme Court could conceivably change its interpretation of
§ 1983 or Congress could amend it.
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the Section 1983 tail wagging the local land use zoning dog, but un-
less the Supreme Court revises its approach, zoning law will have to
examine itself and its foundations with greater care. Of course, the
results of this may be clearly beneficial: sometimes an old dog needs
a good tail-wag.268
268. Cf. Gorman Towers Inc. v. Bogoslavsky 626 F.2d 607, 616 (8th Cir. 1980).
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/3
NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/3
